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Abstract
Lo¨b’s theorem and Go¨del’s theorems make predictions about the behavior
of systems capable of self-reference with unbounded computational resources
with which to write and evaluate proofs. However, in the real world, systems
capable of self-reference will have limited memory and processing speed, so in
this paper we introduce an effective version of Lo¨b’s theorem which is applica-
ble given such bounded resources. These results have powerful implications for
the game theory of bounded agents who are able to write proofs about them-
selves and one another, including the capacity to out-perform classical Nash
equilibria and correlated equilibria, attaining mutually cooperative program
equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Previous cooperative program equi-
libria studied by Tennenholtz (2004) and Fortnow (2009) have depended on
tests for program equality, a fragile condition, whereas “Lo¨bian” cooperation
is much more robust and agnostic of the opponent’s implementation.
1 Background and Overview
The arc of this paper begins and ends with a discussion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
but it passes through a new result in provability logic. Thus, it will hopefully be of
interest to game theorists and logicians alike.
1.1 Open-source Prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a game with two possible actions C (Cooperate)
and D (Defect), with the following payoff matrix:
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C (2, 2) (0, 3)
D (3, 0) (1, 1)
In other words, by choosing D over C, each player can destroy 2 units of its oppo-
nent’s utility to gain 1 unit of its own. As long as the payoffs are truly represented
in the matrix—for example, there are no reputational costs of choosing D that are
not already imputed in the payoffs—then (D,D) is the only Nash equilibrium, and
the only correlated equilibrium. In fact, irrespective of the opponent’s move, it
is better to defect. It is therefore broadly believed that (D,D) is an inevitable
outcome between “rational” agents in a truly represented (non-iterated) Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
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But consider a version of the game—as first studied by Tennenholtz (2004)—
wherein each player is an algorithm which can read its opponent’s source code, as
well as its own, before the game. Is D still the obvious correct strategy? As a
warm-up, one can imagine designing various algorithmic “agents” to compete in
such games. For example, an agent who always cooperates:
def CooperateBot(Opponent) :
return C
Tennenholtz (2004) considers a simple agent which cooperates if and only if the
opponent is identitically equal to itself:
def IsMeBot(Opponent) :
if Opponent=IsMeBot
return C
else
return D
When playing against IsMeBot, the opponent is incentivized to “be IsMeBot”,
and in particular, cooperate. To capture this intuition, Tenenholtz defines a pro-
gram equilibrium to be a pair of agents (programs) competing in a game, with
access to one another’s source code, such that replacing either agent by a different
agent would decrease its expected payoff. Thus, a program equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium of the ‘meta-game’ of choosing which program to play.
Agents in a program equilibrium can return outputs that do not constitute a
Nash equilibrium (of the object-level game), even in a one-shot game, as can be
seen here: (IsMeBot,IsMeBot) is a program equilibrium, returning outputs (C,C)
and payoffs (2,2). This program equilibrium of IsMeBot is highly fragile, however:
if we let IsMeBot’ be the same program but with a tiny irrelevant change to its
code—a comment perhaps—then IsMeBot will defect against it. Agents studied by
Fortnow (2009) are similarly fragile.
To the end of someday designing real-world cooperative agents, it is therefore
interesting to design a more “robust” cooperative agent, whose behavior does not
depend too heavily on the details of the implementation of its opponent, but which
nonetheless incentivizes its opponent to cooperate. For this, consider:
def FairBot_k(Opponent) :
search for a proof of length k that
Opponent(FairBot_k) = C
if found,
return C
else
return D
Here a ‘proof of length k’ means a mathematical proof—say, in some implementation
of Peano Arithmetic—using fewer than k characters (symbols) to write out as a text
file. To begin thinking about these agents, observe that
• CooperateBot(FairBotk) = C, because CooperateBot always returns C;
• FairBotk(CooperateBot) = C when k is large enough to complete the short-
est proof that CooperateBot(FairBotk) = C (which, given the simplicity of
CooperateBot, will be very short), and D when k is too small to complete the
proof.
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1.2 The Example of FairBot vs FairBot
The first interesting question that arises is then:
What is FairBotk(FairBotk)?
It is not so hard to see that if k is too small to complete any proofs, each Fair-
Bot returns D. But suppose k is extremely large, for example, 10100. Does
FairBotk(FairBotk) find a proof that FairBotk(FairBotk) = C and therefore re-
turn C, validating the proof? Or does it continue searching for a proof that
FairBotk(FairBotk) = C until the proof bound is reached, and having found no
such proof, return D, consistent with the failed proof search?
It is worth pausing a moment to reflect on this question, since, when given no
hints, 100% of the dozens of mathematicians and computer scientists I’ve seen asked
it have answered incorrectly at first (myself included).
Consider that each instance of FairBotk is waiting for a proof that the other
FairBotk will return C before it will return C itself, and since neither algorithm
has a clause in its code to take a “leap of faith” in such a situation, it seems that
neither algorithm will “make the first move”, so their proof searches must simply
keep searching until they reach their limit k and return D.
However, this reasoning turns out to be incorrect, because of a version of Lo¨b’s
Theorem that is the main result of this paper, proven in Section 5. It implies that
FairBotk(FairBotk) = C for large k. Aside from being surprising, this result opens
up a whole class of behaviors that can outperform the classical (D,D) equilibrium
in a truly formulated, non-iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Moreover, this performance
can be made more robust, into a statement about any two agents willing to cooperate
based on a proof of their opponents’ cooperation.
Such interesting “Lo¨bian” behavior first seemed plausible from the work of
Ba´ra´sz et al. (2014) and LaVictoire et al. (2014), who illustrated something like pro-
gram equilibria among certain non-computable logical entities they called “modal
agents”, including an analog of FairBot in that context.
1.3 Robust Cooperative Program Equilibria
The main application of this paper is to establish robust cooperative program equi-
libria for computationally bounded agents. In particular, it is possible to write
algorithms which are unexploitable in a Prisoner’s Dilemma—that is, they never
receive the undesirable outcome (C,D) as Player 1—and which achieve the outcome
(C,C) against a variety of opponents, such that there is no incentive for their oppo-
nents to deviate from cooperation, even though there is no iteration or reputation
to be earned in the game. This is what we mean by “robust cooperation”.
To summarize the result, we write kp for the statement “p can be proven using
k or fewer written symbols”. Given a nonnegative increasing function G, we say
that an agent Ak taking a parameter k ∈ N is G-fair if
⊢ k+G(LengthOf(Opp))[Opp(Ak) = Cooperate]→ Ak(Opp) = Cooperate
In other words, if Ak finding a proof that its opponent cooperates is sufficient for
Ak to cooperate, we say it is G-fair, provided the proof lengths in the search did not
exceed k +G(LengthOf(Opp)). Then we have, in terms to be made precise later,
Theorem (Robust cooperation of bounded agents). If certain bounds are
satisfied by the Go¨del encoding of our proof system, and the function G exceeds a
certain asymptotic lower bound, then for any G-fair agents Ak and Bk, we have for
all sufficiently large m,n,
Am(Bn) = Bn(Am) = Cooperate
This result depends crucially on a new version of Lo¨b’s Theorem.
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1.4 Lo¨b’s Theorem
Lo¨b’s Theorem states that, if p denotes the provability of statement p in Peano
Arithmetic (or any extension of it), then
(p→ p)→ p
If the reader has never encountered this result, consider the case where p is the
Riemann Hypothesis, RH . Suppose that the Riemann Hypothesis is, unbeknownst
to us, false. Without yet knowing whether RH is true, it is tempting for us to claim
at least that if RH is provable, then RH is true, i.e. RH → RH . However, if
that claim were itself provable, i.e. if (RH → RH), then Lo¨b’s Theorem tells
us that RH—the Riemann Hypothesis is provable—which is very bad news for
the soundness of our proof system if the Riemann Hypothesis is actually false!
Thus, Lo¨b’s Theorem defies the intuition that we might soundly prove the “self-
trust” statement that if we prove p, then p is true. This counterintuitiveness is in
fact the same phenomenon as the surprising outcome that FairBotk(FairBotk) = C
from earlier, except that the FairBots—being algorithms which halt—only concern
proofs up to a certain bounded length, k. Hence the motivation of this paper: to
establish a version of Lo¨b’s theorem for proofs bounded in length by a parameter, k.
In rough terms, we prove:
Theorem (Parametric Bounded Lo¨b). Suppose p(−) is a logical formula with a
single unquantified variable, and that f : N→ N is computable and exceeds a certain
asymptotic lower bound. Then ∃kˆ :
⊢ ∀k, f(k)p(k)→ p(k)
⇒ ⊢ ∀k > kˆ, p(k)
1.5 Comparison to previous work
As mentioned, Tennenholtz (2004) first defined program equilibria and studied var-
ious ‘non-robust’ examples similar to IsMeBot above, which depend on program
equality. In particular, if one agent is written in C++ while the other is written in
Python, they will defect against each other. Examples studied by Fortnow (2009)
are similarly fragile.
Later, Peters and Szentes (2012) consider agents encoded as a first-order formu-
las over the integers which can reference the Go¨del-numbering of the formula for
the other player as well as its own, but these agents are non-computable in a way
similar to those of Ba´ra´sz et al. (2014) and LaVictoire et al. (2014).
By comparison, the program equilibria exhibited here are both computable and
robust, in that they do not depend on tests for program equality, and generally
exist between many pairs of agents provided they both follow a certain principle of
fairness, in which a new bounded Lo¨b’s Theorem plays a crucial role.
1.6 Long-Term Relevance
As automated reasoning and decision-making systems improve, it is plausible that
some such systems might exhibit a capacity to reason in generality about their own
design principles, and those of other systems. As an illustrative example, such a
system can be designed expressly today: a theorem-prover can be handed a copy
of its own source code and queried to write proofs about it. Less contrivedly, there
might be economic value in creating systems that can reason about themselves and
others, such as for collaboration or negotiation. For example, a human can reason
that he is mentally outclassed in the middle of a competitive game of Go against a
new player, and therefore resign to hedge his losses. Such reasoning invokes a theory
of the reasoning capacity of one’s opponent, and of oneself: algorithms reasoning
about algorithms.
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It therefore seems prudent to explore what game-theoretic dynamics emerge
from algorithms reasoning about each other, beginning with the simplest cases we
can currently state and examine, similar in spirit to the way RAND Corporation’s
Thomas Schelling began his understanding of nuclear deterrence (Schelling 1958b,
1966), by analyzing simple examples of non-zero-sum games (Schelling 1958a).
In this paper, we find that classical game theory—and more generally, causal
decision theory (Gibbard and Harper 1978)—is not an adequate framework for de-
scribing the competitive interactions of algorithms that reason about the source
codes of their opponent algorithms and themselves. When given read access to
one another’s source code—an extreme scenario for two humans, but trivial for
computer systems—competing algorithms can exhibit counterintuitive “Lo¨bian” be-
haviors which, among other things, can robustly achieve cooperative outcomes that
outperform classical Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria. Moreover, the time
at which each algorithm outputs its cooperative decision occurs later in time than
the causal pathway by which it benefits from the decision (namely, the pathway
wherein its opponent predicts its behavior using its source code; see Section 6.1).
Thus, without further investigation, our more classical intuitions about what
group-level behaviors will emerge from such algorithms may miss the mark entirely.
2 Fundamentals
Here we begin building up the main technical result of the paper. The algorithms
examined here will make use of provability logic as a way of “reasoning about
reasoning”, and the main resource bounds on the algorithms, for simplicity, will be
the lengths of the proofs they may discover.
2.1 Proof Length and Notation
If the first line of a three-line proof is so long that it would not fit on any physical
computer system, saying the proof is “only three lines long” is not very descriptive.
Therefore, we will measure proof length in characters instead of lines, the way one
might measure the size of a text file on a computer. An extensive analysis of proof
lengths measured in characters is covered by Pudla´k (1998).
We will fix a proof system S (e.g. an extension of Peano Arithmetic) throughout,
and write
S ⊢
n
φ, or simply ⊢
n
φ
to mean that there exists an S-proof of φ using n or fewer characters. After a choice
of Go¨del encoding for S, it is customary to write φ for ∃n : Bew(n, pφq), i.e., there
exists a number n encoding a proof of φ. This allows S to indirectly talk about the
existence of proofs in S. We will extend this definition to talk about proof lengths:
nφ means ∃m : Bew(m, pφq) and ProofLength(m) < n
where ProofLength(m) denotes the length, in characters, of the proof encoded by
m. In other words, nφ is the S-encoded statement that φ can be proven in S with
n or fewer characters.
2.2 Proof System
We let S be any first-order proof system that
1) can represent computable functions in the sense of Section 2.4,
2) can write any number k ∈ N using Olgk symbols, and
3) allows the definition and expansion of abbreviations during proofs.
For example, we could take Peano Arithmetic, where each proof line is either
• an axiom, or
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• an application of Modus Ponens from lines above it,
and additionally allow ourselves to write numbers in a binary format, and allow
proof lines which are
• the definition of an abbreviation that may be used in subsequent lines, or
• an expansion of an abbreviation used in a previous line.
We have chosen to allow abbreviations in our proof system for two reasons. The first
is that real-world automated proof systems will tend to use abbreviations because
of memory constraints. The second is that abbreviations make the lengths of the
shortest proofs in this system slightly easier to analyze: for example, if a number
N with a very large number of digits occurs in the shortest proof of a proposition,
it will not occur multiple times; instead, it will occur only once, in the definition of
an abbreviation for it. Then, we don’t have to carefully count the number of times
the numeral occurs in the proof to determine its contribution to the proof length;
its contribution will simply be linear in its length, or lgN .
We write
Lang(S) for the language of S,
Langr(S) for the formulas in Lang(S) with r free variables, and
Const(S) for the set of constants in S (e.g. 0, S0, etc.).
2.3 Go¨del Encoding
We fix throughout a Go¨del numbering
#(−) : Lang(S)→ N
and a “numeral” mapping
◦(−) : N→ Const(S) ⊆ Lang(S)
for expressing naturals as constants in S. Note that in traditional PA, for example,
◦5 = SSSSS0. However, to be more realistic we have assumed that S uses a binary
encoding to be more efficient, so e.g.,
◦5 = 101.
The maps #(−) and ◦(−) combine to form a Go¨del encoding
p(−)q : Lang(S)→ Const(S)
pφq :=
◦#φ
which allows S to write proofs about itself.
2.4 Convention for Representing Computable Functions
The astute reader will notice that throughout, although PA and related first-order
theories typically have no symbols for functions, we will often write objectionable
expressions like
⊢ . . . something about f(x) . . .
where f : N→ N is some computable function.
However, there is a convention for interpreting such statements. It is known
(see, e.g. Theorem 6.8 of Cori and Lascar 2001, Part II) that for any computable
function f : N → N, there exists a “graph” predicate Γf (−,−) ∈ Lang2(PA) such
that
∀x ∈ N, PA ⊢ ∀y, Γf (
◦x, y)↔ y = ◦f(x)
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We have assumed that S is capable of representing computable functions in this
way (e.g., by being an extension of PA).
The two-place predicates Γf are cumbersome in writing because each usage
introduces a quantifier. For example, if we we have functions f , g and h and we
want to say that S proves that for any x value, f(x) < g(x) + h(x), technically we
should write
⊢ ∀x∀y1∀y1∀y3, Γf (x, y1) and Γg(x, y2) and Γh(x, y3)→ y1 < y2 + y3
However, for easier reading, in such cases we will abuse notation and write
⊢ ∀x, f(x) < g(x) + h(x),
leaving the expansion in terms of Γ’s and ∀y’s as an exercise to any willing reader.
2.5 Asymptotic Notation
We use the convention that f ≺ g means that for anyM ∈ N, there exists an N ∈ N
such that ∀n > N,Mf(n) < g(n). We write Og for the set of functions f  g, and
for a specific function E we will sometimes write write EOg for the set of functions
of the form E ◦ f where f ∈ Og.
3 A Parametric Diagonal Lemma
Lo¨b’s Theorem can be proven via the classical Diagonal Lemma (Carnap 1934),
which states that for any formula F (−) ∈ Lang1(S) (having one free variable),
there exists a sentence ψ ∈ Lang0(S) (with no free variables) such that
⊢ ψ ↔ F (pψq).
However, to reason about computer systems with certain as-yet unset parameters,
we will need a generalization of the Diagonal Lemma for formulas with free variables
to represent those parameters in a way that avoids writing a separate proof for every
instance of the parameters:
Proposition 1 (Parametric Diagonal Lemma). Suppose S is a first-order theory
capable of representing all computable functions, as in Section 2.4. Then for any
predicate G ∈ Langr+1(S), there exists a predicate ψ ∈ Langr(S) such that
⊢ ∀k¯ = (k1, . . . , kr), ψ(k¯)↔ G(pψq , k¯)
Proof. We define a “partial self-evaluation function” e : N→ N as follows:
e(n) =
{
# [θ(pθq ,−, . . . ,−)] if n = #θ for some θ ∈ Langr+1(S)
0 otherwise
Now, e is computable, and therefore representable in Lang(S), so we can define
β ∈ Langr+1(S) by
β(n, k¯) := G(e(n), k¯)
(using the notational convention of Section 2.4 to avoid writing extra quantifiers
and Γe’s). Then, ∀θ ∈ Langr+1(S),
⊢ ∀k¯ β(pθq , k¯)↔ G(pθ(pθq ,−, . . . ,−)q , k¯)
Now let θ = β, so we have
⊢ ∀k¯ β(p(q β), k¯)↔ G(pβ(pβq ,−, . . . ,−)q , k¯)
Finally, taking ψ(k¯) = β(pβq , k¯) yields the desired result
⊢ ∀k¯ ψ(k¯)↔ G(pψq , k¯)
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4 A Bounded Provability Predicate, k
4.1 Defining k
Given a choice of Go¨del encoding for Peano Arithmetic, it is classical that a predicate
Bew(−,−) ∈ Lang2(S) exists such that Bew(m,n) means, in natural language, that
the number m encodes a proof in PA, and that the number n encodes the statement
it proves. So, the standard provability operator  : Lang(PA)→ Lang(PA) can be
defined as
φ := ∃m : Bew(m, pφq).
We take for granted that Bew exists for S and can be extended to a three-place
predicate Bew(−,−,−) ∈ Lang2(S) such that Bew(m,n, k) means that
• m encodes a proof in S,
• n encodes the statement it proves, and
• the proof encoded bym uses at most k characters when written in the language
of S (not when written using the encoding.)
Then we can define a “bounded” box operator:
kφ = ∃m : Bew(m, pφq , k).
We also take for granted a computable “single variable evaluation” function, Eval1 :
N→ N, such that for any φ(−) ∈ Lang1(S),
Eval1(pφq , k) = pφ(
◦k)q
Since Eval1 is computable, it can be represented in Lang(S) as in Section 2.4. This
allows us to extend the k operator to act on sentences φ(−) with an unbound
variable:
(kφ)(ℓ) := ∃m : Bew(m,Eval1(pφq , ℓ), k)
In words, “There is a proof using k or fewer characters of the formula φ(ℓ)”.
4.2 Basic Properties of k
Each of the following properties will be needed multiple times during the proof of
Parametric Bounded Lo¨b. Since the proof is already highly symbolic, we give these
properties English names to recall them.
Property 1 (Implication Distribution). There is a constant c ∈ Const(S) such
that for any p, q ∈ Lang(S),
⊢ ∀a∀b, a(p→ q)→ (bp→ a+b+cq).
Proof sketch. The fact that one can combine a proof of an implication with the
proof of its antecedent to obtain a proof of its consequent can be proven in general,
with quantified variables in place of the Go¨del numbers of the particular statements
involved. Let us suppose this general proof has length c0. Then, we need only
instantiate the statements in it to p and q. However, if p and q are long expressions,
they can have been abbreviated in the earlier proofs without lengthening them, so
they can be written in abbreviated form again during this step. Hence, the total
cost of combining the two proofs is around c = 2c0, which is constant with respect
to p and q.
Property 2 (Quantifier Distribution). There is a constant C ∈ Const(S) such that
for any φ(−) ∈ Lang1(S),
⊢ N (∀kφ(k))
⇒ ⊢ ∀k C+2N+lg kφ(k), which in turn
⇒ ⊢ ∀k Olg kφ(k)
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Proof. An encoded proof of φ(◦K) for a specific K can be obtained by specializ-
ing the conclusion of an N -character encoded proof of ∀kφ(k) and appending the
specialization with ◦K in place of k at the end. To avoid repeating ◦K numerous
times in the final line (in case it is large), we will use an abbreviation for φ. Thus
the appended lines can say:
(1) let Φ stand for pφq
(2) Φ(◦K)
Let us analyze how many characters are needed to write such lines. First, we need
a string Φ to use as an abbreviation for φ. Since no string of length N2 has yet been
used as an abbreviation in the earlier proof (otherwise we can shorten the proof by
not defining and using the abbreviation), we can surely have Length(Φ) < N2 . We
also need some constant c number of characters to write out the system’s equivalent
of “let”, “stand for”, “(”, and “)”. Finally, we need lgK characters to write ◦K.
Altogether, the proof was extended by C +N + lg (k) characters, for a total length
of 2N + c+ lgk.
5 Parametric Bounded Lo¨b
Definition 2 (Proof expansion function). We choose a computable function E :
N → N to bound the expansion of proof lengths when we Go¨del-encode them. Its
definition is that it must be large enough to satisfy the following two properties:
Property 3 (Bounded Necessitation). ∀φ ∈ Lang(S),
⊢
k
φ (5.1)
⇒ ⊢
Ek
kφ (5.2)
Property 4 (Bounded Inner Necessitation). For any φ ∈ Lang(S),
⊢ kφ→ Ekkφ.
Estimating E. How large must E be in practice? Go¨del numberings for sequences
of integers can be achieved in On space (Tsai, Chang, and Chen 2002), as can Go¨del
numberings of term algebras (Tarau 2013). To check that one line is an application
of Modus Ponens from previous lines, if the proof encoding indexes the implication
to which MP is applied, is a test for string equality that is linear in the length of
the lines. Finally, to check that an abbreviation has been applied or expanded,
if the proof encoding indexes where the abbreviation occurs, is also a linear time
test for string equality. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect E ∈ Ok for real-world
theorem-provers. But however large it may be, in any case we have:
Theorem 3 (Parametric Bounded Lo¨b). Suppose p(−) ∈ Lang1(S) is a formula
with a single unquantified variable, and that f : N → N is computable and satisfies
f(k) ≻ EOlgk. Then ∃kˆ :
⊢ ∀k, f(k)p(k)→ p(k)
⇒ ⊢ ∀k > kˆ, p(k)
Note: In fact a weaker statement
⊢ ∀k > k1, f(k)p(k)→ p(k)
is sufficient to derive the consequent, since we could just redefine f(k) to be 0 for
k ≤ k1 and then f(k)p(k) → p(k) is vacuously true and provable for k ≤ k1 as
well.
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Proof. (In this proof, each centered equation will follow directly from the one above
it unless otherwise noted.)
We begin by choosing some function g(k) such that lgk ≺ g(k) and Eg(k) ≺
f(k). For example, we could take g(k) = ⌊
√
(lgk)(E−1f(k))⌋. Define a predicate
G(−,−) ∈ Lang2(S) by
G(n, k) := (∃m : Bew(m,Eval1(n, k), g(k)))→ p(k)
so that for any φ(−) ∈ Lang1(S),
G(pφq , k) = g(k)φ(k)→ p(k).
Now, by the Parametric Diagonal Lemma, ∃ψ(−) ∈ Lang1(S) such that in some
number of characters n,
⊢
n
∀k ψ(k)↔ G(pψq , k) (5.3)
By Bounded Necessitation,
⊢ n (∀k ψ(k)↔ G(pψq , k))
By Quantifier Distribution, since n is constant with respect to k,
⊢ ∀k Olgk (ψ(k)↔ G(pψq , k)) ,
in which we can specialize to the forward implication,
⊢ ∀k Olgk (ψ(k)→ G(pψq , k))
By Implication Distribution of Olg k,
⊢ ∀k∀a aψ(k)→ a+OlgkG(pψq , k)
By Implication Distribution again, this time of a+Olg k over the implication
G(pψq , k) = g(k)φ(k)→ p(k), we obtain
⊢ ∀k∀a∀b aψ(k)→
(
bg(k)ψ(k)→ a+b+Olgkp(k)
)
Now we specialize this equation to a = g(k) and b = h(k), where h : N → N
is a computable function satisfying Eg(k) ≺ h(k) ≺ f(k), for example h(k) =
⌊
√
f(k)Eg(k)⌋:
⊢ ∀k g(k)ψ(k)→
(
h(k)g(k)ψ(k)→ g(k)+h(k)+Olg kp(k)
)
Then since g(k) + h(k) +Olgk < f(k) after some bound k > k1, we have
⊢ ∀k > k1, g(k)ψ(k)→
(
h(k)g(k)ψ(k)→ f(k)p(k)
)
Now, by hypothesis, ⊢ ∀k f(k)p(k)→ p(k), thus
⊢ ∀k > k1, g(k)ψ(k)→
(
h(k)g(k)ψ(k)→ p(k)
)
(5.4)
Also, without any of the above, from Bounded Inner Necessitation we can write
⊢ ∀k∀a aψ(k)→ Eaaψ(k)
From this, with a = g(k), we have
⊢ ∀k g(k)ψ(k)→ Eg(k)g(k)ψ(k)
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Now, since Eg(k) < h(k) after some bound k > k2, we have
⊢ ∀k > k2 g(k)ψ(k)→ h(k)g(k)ψ(k) (5.5)
Next, from Equations 5.4 and 5.5, assuming we chose k2 ≥ k1 for convenience, we
have
⊢ ∀k > k2, g(k)ψ(k)→ p(k) (5.6)
But from Equation 5.3, the implication here is equivalent to ψ(k), so we have
⊢
N
∀k > k2, ψ(k),
where N is the number of characters needed for the proof above. From this, by
Bounded Necessitation, we have
⊢ N [∀k > k2, ψ(k)].
By Quantifier Distribution of N ,
⊢ ∀k > k2, Olg kψ(k)
and since Olgk < g(k) after some bound k > kˆ, taking kˆ ≥ k2 for convenience, we
have
⊢ ∀k > kˆ, g(k)ψ(k). (5.7)
Finally, from Equations 5.6 and 5.7 we have
⊢ ∀k > kˆ, p(k),
as required.
6 Robust Cooperation of Bounded Agents in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Ba´ra´sz et al. (2014), LaVictoire et al. (2014), and others have exhibited various
proof-based agents who robustly cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma by basing
their decisions on proofs about each other’s cooperation. However, their agents are
purely logical entities which can discover proofs of unbounded length, and so are
impossible to run on a physical computer. This leaves open the question of whether
such behavior is achievable by agents with bounded computational resources.
So, consider the following bounded agent, where G is some increasing, non-
negative function to be determined later, and G = 0 recovers the definition of
FairBot from Section 1:
def FairBot_k(Opponent) :
let B = k + G(LengthOf(Opponent))
search for proof of length at most B that
Opponent(FairBot_k) = Cooperate
if found,
return Cooperate
else
return Defect
Question: What is FairBotk(FairBotk)? It seems intuitive that each FairBot is
waiting for the other to provably cooperate, in a bottomless regression that will
exhaust the proof bound B. Thus, they will find no proof of cooperation, and hence
defect.
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However, this turns out not to be the case, as a consequence of Parametric
Bounded Lo¨b. We let
p(k) := [FairBotk(FairBotk) = Cooperate].
Since G ≥ 0, k ≤ B in the definition of FairBot, so we have
⊢ kp(k)→ Bp(k).
Now since Bp(k) is FairBot’s criterion for cooperation, we also have
⊢ Bp(k)→ p(k), so
⊢ ∀k, kp(k)→ p(k),
whence for sufficiently large kˆ, by Parametric Bounded Lo¨b,
⊢ ∀k > kˆ, p(k).
In other words, FairBotk cooperates with FairBotk for large k.
This result is interesting for three reasons:
1. It is surprising. 100% of the dozens of mathematicians and computer scien-
tists that I’ve asked to guess the output of FairBotk(FairBotk) have guessed
incorrectly (expecting the proof searches to enter an infinite regress and thus
reach their bounds), or have given an invalid argument for cooperation (such
as “it would be better to cooperate, so they will”).
2. It is advantageous. FairBot outperforms the classical Nash/correlated equi-
librium solution (Defect, Defect) to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in a one-shot
game with no iteration or future reputation. Moreover, it does so while being
unexploitable: if an opponent will defect against FairBot, FairBot will find no
proof of the opponent’s cooperation, so it will also defect.
3. It is robust. Previous examples of cooperative program equilibria studied by
Tennenholtz (2004) and Fortnow (2009) all involved cooperation based on
equality of programs, a very fragile condition. For example, the agent IsMe-
Bot from the introduction will mutually defect against an identical opponent
written in a different programming language, or even in a slightly different
style. Such fragility is not desirable if we wish to build real-world cooperative
systems.
Taking this robustness further, we next demonstrate mutual cooperative pro-
gram equilibria among a wide variety of (unequal) agents, provided only that they
employ a certain “principle of fairness”. Given a non-negative increasing function
G, we say that an agent Ak taking a parameter k ∈ N is G-fair if
⊢ k+G(LengthOf(Opp))[Opp(Ak) = C]→ Ak(Opp) = C
In other words, if Ak finding a proof that its opponent cooperates is sufficient for
Ak to cooperate, we say it is G-fair, provided the proofs in the search did not exceed
length k +G(LengthOf(Opp)). The agents FairBotk defined above are G-fair, and
the reader is encouraged to keep these examples in mind for the following result:
Theorem 4 (Robust cooperation of bounded agents). Suppose that
• the proof expansion function E (defined in Section 5) of our proof system
satisfies EOlg k ≺ k,
• f is any function satisfying EOlgk ≺ f(k) ≺ k, and
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• G is any increasing function satisfying G(ℓ) > 6f(2ℓ).
Then, for any G-fair agents Ak and Bk, we can choose a threshold r such that for
all m,n > r,
Am(Bn) = Bn(Am) = Cooperate
Feasibility of bounds. Before proceeding, recall from Section 5 that we can
achieve E ∈ Ok for automatic proof systems that are designed for easy verifiability,
in which case EOlgk = Olgk, well below the ≺ k requirement.
Proof. For brevity, we let
a(k) := G(LengthOf(Ak)), (6.1)
b(k) := G(LengthOf(Bk)), (6.2)
α(m,n) := [Am(Bn) = Cooperate], and (6.3)
β(n,m) := [Bn(Am) = Cooperate] (6.4)
so we can write the G-fairness conditions more compactly as
⊢m+b(n)β(n,m)→ α(m,n) and (6.5)
⊢n+a(m)α(m,n)→ β(n,m).
Now, LengthOf(Ak) > lgk and LengthOf(Bk) > lgk since they must reference
the parameter k in their code. Applying G to both sides yields
a(k), b(k) > G(lgk) > 6f(k). (6.6)
Define an “eventual cooperation” predicate:
p(k) := ∀m > k, ∀n > k, α(m,n) and β(n,m).
Using Quantifier Distribution once on the definition of p(k),
⊢ ∀k[f(k)p(k)→ ∀m > k, C+2f(k)+lgm[∀n > k, α(m,n) and β(n,m)]]
Applying Quantifier Distribution again,
⊢ ∀k[f(k)p(k)→ ∀m > k, ∀n > k, 3C+4f(k)+2lgm+lgn[α(m,n) and β(n,m)]]
(6.7)
Now, for m,n large and > k, we have
3C + lgn < n and by (6.6),
4f(k) + 2lgm < 6f(m) < a(m).
Adding these inequalities yields
3C + 4f(k) + 2lgm+ lgn < n+ a(m),
so for some k1, from (6.7) we derive
⊢ ∀k > k1, [f(k)p(k)→ ∀m > k, ∀n > k, n+a(m)α(m,n)].
Similarly, we also have
3C + 2lgm < m and
4f(k) + lgn < 5f(n) < b(n), so for some k2 ≥ k1,
⊢ ∀k > k2 [f(k)p(k)→ ∀m > k, ∀n > k, n+a(m)α(m,n) and m+b(n)β(n,m)]
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Thus by (6.5),
⊢ ∀k > k2[f(k)p(k)→ ∀m > k, ∀n > k, c(n,m) and c(m,n)], i.e.
⊢ ∀k > k2, f(k)p(k)→ p(k)
Therefore, by Parametric Bounded Lo¨b (and the note following it), for some kˆ we
have
⊢ ∀k > kˆ, p(k).
In other words, for all m,n > kˆ + 1,
Am(Bn) = Bn(Am) = Cooperate.
6.1 Ramifications for Causal Decision Theory
Causal Decision Theory (Gibbard and Harper 1978) is a framework for evaluating
the desirability of an action by assessing the causal consequences of the action itself.
The interaction of FairBotm and FairBotn present a challenge to Causal Decision
Theory, in a way similar to Newcomb’s Problem (Nozick 1969), a classic scenario
wherein one agent is able to predict the actions of another.
Concretely, imagine FairBotm and FairBotn are played against each other while
being run on separate computers in separate rooms, and that they will print their
final responses, C or D, at the same time. When FairBotm decides to cooperate
with FairBotn, it does so after computing a proof that FairBotn(FairBotm) = C,
but before its opponent FairBotn actually prints its response. There is therefore no
causal effect transmitted from the value that FairBotn prints to its screen to the
value that FairBotm prints to its screen. So from a purely causal perspective, there
is an “incentive” for FairBotn to print D instead of C, since that would have “no
effect” on its opponent, and would counterfactually yield the better outcome (D,C)
in place of (C,C). Thus one might argue that FairBotn is acting sub-optimally in
this scenario: its response could be changed to obtain a better outcome, (D,C).
However, such reasoning is misplaced from a strategic standpoint. FairBotn
cannot output D while its opponent FairBotm outputs C, for that outcome would
be logically incoherent. Although the instance of FairBotn running as Player 2 has
no causal effect on the FairBotm running as Player 1, it cannot treat its decision as
independent: the outcome (C,D) is simply not attainable by any agent under any
circumstances when Player 1 is FairBotm.
This prompts a re-thinking of what it means to make an optimal decision as an
algorithm whose source code is transparent. Such questions, and some of their long-
term relevance, have already been considered at length in Soares and Fallenstein
(2015).
7 Summary
We have discovered a version of Lo¨b’s Theorem which can be applied to algorithms
with bounded computational resources. This result, in turn, can be used by algo-
rithmic agents that have access to one another’s source codes to achieve cooperative
outcomes (among other things) that out-perform classical Nash equilibria and cor-
related equilibria, via conditions that are much more robust than previously known
examples depending on program equality. Moreover, the causal pathway by which
each agent benefits from its own decision to cooperate happens before the agent
actually computes its decision, which prompts a re-thinking of the causal analysis
of optimal decision-making known as Causal Decision Theory in a setting where
decision-making agents are algorithms with transparent source-codes.
In light of these findings, classical game theoretic results and the intuitions we
derive from them may be quite far from describing what we should actually expect
14
from systems of agents capable of reasoning about each other’s design. In order to
ensure robust and beneficial long-term deployment of advanced AI technologies in
the future, as described in Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark (2015) and supported by
over 100 researchers in the Future of Life Institute’s Open Letter (Tegmark 2015), it
seems prudent to investigate these dynamics ahead of time, so as to be prepared for
the sorts of game-theoretic scenarios that might arise between algorithmic agents
in the future.
As a direction for potential future investigation, it seems inevitable that other
agents described in the purely logical (non-computable) setting of Ba´ra´sz et al.
(2014) and LaVictoire et al. (2014) will likely have bounded, algorithmic analogs,
and that many more general consequences of Lo¨b’s Theorem—perhaps all the the-
orems of Go¨del–Lo¨b provability logic—will have resource-bounded analogs as well.
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